


What's Happening in **TLS**?

Mark Nottingham,  

@mnot



John Allsopp

@johnallsopp

[#heartbleeding](#)? Come hear two of the worlds leading web security experts [@mnot](#) and [@creativemisuse](#) at Code melbourne.
webdirections.org/code14/

[↩ Reply](#) [↻ Retweet](#) [★ Favorite](#) [⋮ More](#)

RETWEETS


6

FAVORITE

1



9:53 AM - 10 Apr 2014




Mark Nottingham

@mnot

@johnallsopp Oh, I am so not a “leading security expert” — I just drink with some of them :)

[↩ Reply](#) [🗑 Delete](#) [★ Favorite](#) [⋮ More](#)

10:01 AM - 10 Apr 2014



John Allsopp

@johnallsopp

@mnot that'll do ;-)

[↩ Reply](#) [↻ Retweet](#) [★ Favorite](#) [⋮ More](#)

10:09 AM - 10 Apr 2014



<http://imgtfy.com/?q=heartbleed>



: Some Lessons Learned

- TLS is wicked complex
- Dangerously close to a monoculture (OpenSSL)
- Open Source is not magical (but it's not the problem here)
- Incident handling is really important
 - Assume compromised keys / infrastructure


Recent Goals in the TLS Community

1. More **TLS**
2. Better **Trust**
3. More **Speed**

More TLS



<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-farrell-perpass-attack/>



Google™
👤 Street View

More TLS: HTTP/2

- HTTP/2 doesn't *require* TLS, but Firefox and Chrome engineers say: **“We will only support HTTP/2 over TLS.”**
- They position this as a “carrot.”
- Network operators aren't happy about this

IE	Firefox	Chrome	Safari	Opera	iOS Safari	Opera Mini	Android Browser	Blackberry Browser	IE Mobile
11.0	28.0	34.0	7.0	20.0	7.0	5.0-7.0	4.4	10.0	10.0

<http://http2.github.io/>

HTTP:// over TLS

- Mozilla is interested in **transparently** using TLS for http:// URIs
 - No change in security context, browser UI
 - Makes protocol upgrades easier
 - Defeats purely **passive** attacks
- This is controversial; some feel it “cheapens” TLS

Better Trust



A-Trust-nQual-01

Root certificate authority

Expires: Monday, 1 December 2014 10:00:00 am Australian Eastern Daylight Time

⊗ This certificate is marked as not trusted for all users

Name	Kind	Expires	Keychain
⊗ A-Trust-nQual-01	certificate	1 Dec 2014 10:00:00 am	System Roots
⊗ A-Trust-nQual-03	certificate	18 Aug 2015 8:00:00 am	System Roots
⊗ A-Trust-Qual-01	certificate	1 Dec 2014 10:00:00 am	System Roots
⊗ A-Trust-Qual-02	certificate	3 Dec 2014 10:00:00 am	System Roots
AAA Certificate Services	certificate	1 Jan 2029 10:59:59 am	System Roots
AC Raíz Certicámara S.A.	certificate	3 Apr 2030 8:42:02 am	System Roots
Actalis Authentication Root CA	certificate	22 Sep 2030 9:22:02 pm	System Roots
AddTrust Class 1 CA Root	certificate	30 May 2020 8:38:31 pm	System Roots
AddTrust External CA Root	certificate	30 May 2020 8:48:38 pm	System Roots
AddTrust Public CA Root	certificate	30 May 2020 8:41:50 pm	System Roots
AddTrust Qualified CA Root	certificate	30 May 2020 8:44:50 pm	System Roots
Admin-Root-CA	certificate	10 Nov 2021 6:51:07 pm	System Roots
AdminCA-CD-T01	certificate	25 Jan 2016 11:36:19 pm	System Roots
AffirmTrust Commercial	certificate	1 Jan 2031 1:06:06 am	System Roots
AffirmTrust Networking	certificate	1 Jan 2031 1:08:24 am	System Roots
AffirmTrust Premium	certificate	1 Jan 2041 1:10:36 am	System Roots
AffirmTrust Premium ECC	certificate	1 Jan 2041 1:20:24 am	System Roots
America Online Root Certification Authority 1	certificate	20 Nov 2037 7:43:00 am	System Roots
America Online Root Certification Authority 2	certificate	30 Sep 2037 12:08:00 am	System Roots
AOL Time Warner Root Certification Authority 1	certificate	21 Nov 2037 2:03:00 am	System Roots
AOL Time Warner Root Certification Authority 2	certificate	29 Sep 2037 9:43:00 am	System Roots



<http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/transitive-trust/>

Http Strict Transport Security

Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=7776000

- “I’m only available over HTTPS. Don’t let users click through errors.”
- Can include subdomains
- Talk to browsers about “preloading”

IE	Firefox	Chrome	Safari	Opera	iOS Safari	Opera Mini	Android Browser	Blackberry Browser	IE Mobile
11.0	28.0	34.0	7.0	20.0	7.0	5.0-7.0	4.4	10.0	10.0


<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797>

Public-Key-Pins

```
Public-Key-Pins: max-age=31536000;  
pin-sha1="4n972HfV354KP560yw4uqe/baXc=";  
pin-sha256="LPJNu1+wow4m6DsqxbninhsWHlwfp0JecwQzYpOLmCQ="
```

- “Pins” specific certs in the browser to avoid Rogue CAs
- May or may not catch MITMs
- Risk of locking your users out of your site; be careful...

<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning>



Certificate Transparency


- “Notaries” as public cryptographic logs of CA activity
- Logs can then be monitored for rogue CAs
- Browsers can audit specific certs to make sure they show up in logs
- Chrome will require for EV certs soon

<http://www.certificate-transparency.org/>

More Speed

ChaCha20 Poly1305

- New Cipher Suite from DJB
- **AEAD** = Authentication and Encryption Concurrently
 - Easier to optimise
- Fast on mobile hardware (i.e., w/o AES acceleration)
- Constant time
- < 100 LoC




<http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2014/04/speeding-up-and-strengthening-https.html>

<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305>

TLS 1.3

- **Goals:**
 - Encrypt the Handshake
 - Reduce Handshake Latency
 - **0RT** or **1RT**
 - Improve the Crypto
 - Better cipher suites
 - Ditch Compression, Renegotiation?
- Starting now, done by EOY (?)



<https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/>

MOAR

- <https://www.howssmyssl.com/>
- <https://isTLStastyet.com/>
- <https://bettercrypto.org/>