Re: [syndication] XSL stylesheet for RSS (all versions)

[burton@openprivacy.org]

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"Mark Nottingham" <mnot@mnot.net> writes:

> I think we can make it rewarding to type the data, by desiging
> applications that take advantage of it (e.g., discovery through LINKs and
> conneg, etc.).
> 
> The one thing that I found that *requires* a media type (and the reason that I
> went down this path in the first place) is browser support for a RSS
> aggregator - i.e., the user clicks on a link, the browser notes that it's
> application/rss+xml, dispatches to a local app, which then sucks it in /
> redirects it to a URI for processing. This is the only aggregator-agnostic way
> to do subscription.

Hm... maybe.

The content producer could use a x-rss: scheme.  Also they could do <a
type="application/rss+xml" (assuming deployment to a machine which doesn't
handle type directly).  It would also be possible to 'detect' the media type
within the browser, though this would require some support :(

> I'd do a demo, but my programming skills don't extend to desktop app sort of
> things... Hmm, perhaps a little Python script...
<snip/>

... or my protozilla-rss hack within Mozilla ;)

Kevin

- -- 
Kevin A. Burton ( burton@apache.org, burton@openprivacy.org, burton@peerfear.org )
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Humans are incapable of securely storing high-quality cryptographic keys, and
they have unacceptable speed and accuracy when performing cryptographic
operations. (They are also large, expensive to maintain, difficult to manage,
and they pollute the environment. It is astonishing that these devices continue
to be manufactured and deployed. But they are sufficiently pervasive that we
must design our protocols around their limitations.)

     -- Kaufman, Perlman, and Speciner quoted in Anderson's 'Security Engineering'
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